Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2007

Justin Brent Peterson v. Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard,
Chief Paul Cunningham, Salt Lake County Jail,
Taylorsville Justice Court : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; Debra M. Nelson; Heather Brereton; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Karl L.
Hendrickson; Deputy District Attorney.
John N. Brems; George B. Hofmann; Parsons Kinghorn Harris.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Peterson v. Kennard, No. 20070238.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2699

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JUSTIN BRENT PETERSON,
Petitioner and Appellant,
Case No. 20070238
-vsSHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD,
CHIEF PAUL CUNNINGHAM, SALT
LAKE COUNTY JAIL, and
TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT,
Respondents and Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT

JOAN C. WATT (3967)
DEBRA M.NELSON (9176)
HEATHER BRERETON (8151)
SALT LAKE LEGAL
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
Justin Brent Peterson
KARL L HENDRICKSON
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
2001 South State Street, S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Attorneys for Appellees Sheriff Aaron
D. Kennard, Chief Paul Cunningham,
and the Salt Lake County Jail

JOHN N. BREMS (3769)
GEORGE B. HOFMANN (1
PARSONS KINGHORN H
111 East Broadway, 11th F |
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee
Taylorsville Justice Court

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE f f |

SEP 261

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JUSTIN BRENT PETERSON,
Petitioner and Appellant,
Case No. 20070238
-vsSHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD,
CHIEF PAUL CUNNINGHAM, SALT
LAKE COUNTY JAIL, and
TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT,
Respondents and Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT

JOAN C. WATT (3967)
DEBRA M.NELSON (9176)
HEATHER BRERETON (8151)
SALT LAKE LEGAL
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
Justin Brent Peterson
KARL L HENDRICKSON
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
2001 South State Street, S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Attorneys for Appellees Sheriff Aaron
D. Kennard, Chief Paul Cunningham,
and the Salt Lake County Jail

JOHN N. BREMS (3769)
GEORGE B. HOFMANN (10005)
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee
Taylorsville Justice Court

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

TEXT OF SIXTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

I. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below

3

II. Statement of the Facts

5

A. Events Leading to Peterson's Guilty Plea

5

B. Peterson's Guilty Plea

8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

12

ARGUMENT

14

I. Peterson's Constitutional Claim is Not Facially Plausible, and
Therefore No Unusual Circumstances Are Present that
Could Justify Post-Conviction Relief

14

A. This Court Rejects Post-Conviction Challenges that
Are Not Facially Plausible

14

B. Peterson's Claim that He Was Deprived of His
Right to Counsel Is Not Facially Plausible

16

C. The Fact that Peterson Was Not Represented by Counsel
Does Not Represent "Unusual Circumstances" to
Justify His Failure to Seek a Trial De Novo

19

II. Should this Court Reach the Merits of Peterson's Petition,
it Should Affirm the Court of Appeals' Ruling that Peterson
Failed to Prove a Violation of His Right to Counsel

22

A. The Presumption of Regularity Attaches to Peterson's
Conviction Because There is Ample Evidence that Peterson
Waived His Right to Counsel

22

B. Peterson Failed to Adduce Any Evidence that He Did Not
Waive His Right to Counsel or that His Waiver Was Not
Knowing, Voluntary, and Intelligent

24

C. Even Assuming Peterson Produced Evidence to Rebut the
Presumption of Regularity, His Waiver of Counsel Was
Constitutionally Valid

25

1. Standards for Waiver of the Right to Counsel

25

2. Peterson's Waiver of Counsel Was Valid Under the
Tovar Court's Standards

28

3. Peterson's Waiver of Counsel Was Valid Under the
Pre-Tovar Utah Precedent

31

a. Peterson Was Aware of the Dangers and Disadvantages
of Self-Representation

32

b. Peterson Was Advised of His Right to Counsel, and
Exercised His Right to Defend Himself

34

c. Judge Kwan Ascertained that Peterson Possessed the
Intelligence and Capacity to Understand and Appreciate
the Consequences of his Decision to Represent Himself

34

d. Judge Kwan Ascertained that Peterson Comprehended
the Nature of the Charges and Proceedings and
the Range of Permissible Punishments

37

CONCLUSION

40

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page

Benvenuto v. State. 2007 UT 53, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 22

15, 21

Brown v. Turner. 440 P.2d 968 (Utah 1968)

20

Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980)

20

Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983)

19-20

Gardner v. Galetka. 2004 UT42, 94 P.2d 263

15

Gardner v. Galetka. 2007 UT 3,151 P.3d 968

15

Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d 608 (Utah 1995)

15

Iowa v. Tovar. 541 U.S. 77 (2004)

13, 17-18, 25-28

Lucero v. Kennard. 2005 UT 79,125 P.3d 917

14, 22

Moench v. State. 2004 UT App 57, 88 P.3d 353

18, 36

Peterson v. Kennard. 2007 UT App 26, 156 P.3d 834
Rudolph v. Galetka. 2002 UT 7, 43 P.3d 467
State v. Arquelles. 2003 UT 1, 63 P.2d 731

4, 22, 24-25
15, 19-20
27, 32

State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

36

State v. Pedockie. 2006 UT 28, 137 P.3d 716

26

State v. Valencia. 2001 UT App. 159, 27 P.3d 573

36

State v. Von Ferguson. 2007 UT 1

2, 16-17, 22, 24-25

Webster v. Jones. 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978)

iii

20

Rules
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)

23, 29-30, 37-38

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-122 (2002)

23, 38

United States Constitution
U.S. Const. Amend. VI

2

iv

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JUSTIN BRENT PETERSON,
Petitioner and Appellant,
Case No. 20070238
-vsSHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD,
CHIEF PAUL CUNNINGHAM, SALT
LAKE COUNTY JAIL, and
TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT,
Respondents and Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue 1 : Are unusual circumstances present that justify a collateral attack on a
criminal sentence, where petitioner Justin Brent Peterson ("Peterson") did not
present a scintilla of evidence to support his counsel's allegation that he was
denied his right to the assistance of counsel?
Issue 2: Did the court of appeals err in concluding, based on Peterson's written
waiver of his right to counsel, that some evidence existed that Peterson waived
his right to counsel, thus shifting the burden onto Peterson to overcome his
conviction's presumption of regularity?

Issue 3: Whether the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that Peterson failed
to meet his burden to overcome his conviction's presumption of regularity, where
Peterson failed to testify that his waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case is on appeal pursuant to this Court's Amended Order dated July
3, 2007 granting Peterson's petition for writ of certiorari. "On certiorari," this Court
reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district court. We
conduct that review for correctness, ceding no deference to the court of appeals."
State v. Von Ferguson. 2007 UT 1 (citations omitted).

TEXT OF SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below
This case is the result of Justin Brent Peterson ("Peterson") filing a petition

for post-conviction relief based on an alleged denial of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. In February, 2000, Peterson was cited for possession of a controlled
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 8.
On July 18, 2000 (two days before he was scheduled for trial), Peterson
appeared voluntarily in the Taylorsville Justice Court to plead guilty to the
charges against him. R. 145:40, 44; Exhibit 8. Peterson read and signed a
document entitled Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Rights (Exhibit 7), which
included the waiver of Peterson's right to counsel. R. 145:27, 41. Taylorsville
Justice Court Judge Michael W. Kwan then went through his "typical" Rule 11
colloquy with Peterson, and Peterson entered a guilty plea to the charges against
him. R. 145:57-58; Exhibit 8.
About two years later, on August 9, 2002, Peterson filed a petition for postconviction relief (the "Petition"), claiming that Peterson "was sentenced to jail in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Alabama
v. Shelton. 122 S.Ct. 1764 (2002)." R. 1. Although the Petition was supported by
a memorandum of law, it was not supported by any affidavits or other sworn
statements. See R. 1-9. Significantly, Peterson had not previously challenged
his sentence through the avenue of a trial de novo in the district court.
3

On January 17, 2003, Judge Sandra N. Peuler of the Third District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, held a hearing on the Petition. On
February 20, 2003, the district court entered its order dismissing the Petition,
finding that Peterson did not meet his burden of proof and that Peterson made a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. R. 118.
Peterson appealed the dismissal of his Petition to the Utah Court of
Appeals. R. 132-33. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Peterson's postconviction "challenge to his justice court convictions is barred by his failure to
seek a trial de novo in the district court." Peterson v. Kennard. 2007 UT App 26,
U 17,156 P.3d 834. The court of appeals also ruled that "[a]s an alternative
ground upon which to affirm the district court's denial of Peterson's PCRA [PostConviction Remedies Act] action, we note that the record contains ample
evidence to support the district court's determination that Peterson failed to prove
a violation of his right to have counsel present at his justice court hearing." jd.
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II.

Statement of the Facts
A.

Events Leading to Peterson's Guilty Plea

On or about February 24, 2000, Peterson was cited for possession of a
controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 8. Peterson has never
challenged the substance of the charged offenses. See Exhibit 8; R. 145:11-12
("We are not challenging the conviction in this case. We are solely challenging
the sentence . . . " ) .
On March 21, 2000, Peterson requested admission to the Taylorsville
Substance Abuse Program. Exhibit 6; Exhibit 8. The Taylorsville Substance
Abuse Program provides that upon acceptance and admission to the program
that the applicant plead guilty and the guilty plea is held in abeyance pending
successful completion of the program. See Exhibit 6. Upon completion of the
program the plea will be withdrawn and charges dismissed. See id. Peterson
signed, completed and submitted an "Application for Admission to City of
Taylorsville Substance Abuse Court" (the "Application"). Exhibit 6. The
Application included the following paragraph which Peterson initialed: "Counsel. I
have the right to consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge
were to determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge
could appoint one to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was
able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me." k l

5

The Application also notified Peterson, among other things, of his right to a
jury trial, that he was presumed innocent, that Taylorsville was required to prove
the elements of his crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his conviction
could be used to enhance penalties for any future convictions.

\_±

Under the Taylorsville Justice Court's supervision, Peterson attended
weekly drug court reviews from late March through late June 2000. Exhibit 8.
On June 27, 2000, the Taylorsville Justice Court determined that Peterson
could not participate further in the Taylorsville Substance Abuse Program, and his
case was set for trial on July 20, 2000. i d The docket from the Taylorsville
Justice Court shows that Peterson appeared before Judge Michael W. Kwan
("Judge Kwan") at least seven times between March and June 27, 2000. JdL
On July 18, 2000 (two days before his scheduled trial), Peterson appeared
voluntarily in the Taylorsville Justice Court to plead guilty to these charges. R.
145:40, 44; Exhibit 8. Peterson testified that he was familiar with Judge Kwan by
the time Peterson appeared before him on July 18, 2000. R. 145:33. Peterson
also acknowledged that he "had appeared numerous times in front of Judge
Kwan" before July 18, 2000. R.145:41. Likewise, Judge Kwan was also very
familiar with Peterson. R. 145:55, 58-59. Peterson had "been a defendant" in
Judge Kwan's court "for probably over a year on other matters." R. 145:59.
The "other matters" to which Judge Kwan referred related to charges
brought against Peterson for (i) failing to stop at a controlled intersection in 1999
6

(Exhibit 1); (ii) playing loud music in 1999 (Exhibit 3); and (iii) failing to pay the
fine associated with the failure to stop at a controlled intersection charges,
resulting in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest (Exhibit 1). On February 24,
2000 (six months before Peterson agreed to plead guilty on the charges at issue
in this case), Peterson was arrested and brought to Judge Kwan's court. \± At
this February 24, 2000 hearing, Judge Kwan advised Peterson of his Rule 11
rights, Peterson signed a "Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Rights" and
pleaded guilty to the failure to stop charges. Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2; R. 145:31. Also
on February 24, 2000, Peterson signed a separate "Defendant's Waiver of
Constitutional Rights" and pleaded guilty to charges against him for "loud music."
Exhibit 3. Peterson waived his right to counsel with respect to both of the
charges to which he pleaded guilty on February 24, 2000. Exhibit 2; Exhibit 3.
Moreover, in June 2000, Peterson pleaded guilty in the Midvale Justice
Court to (i) reckless driving, possession of a controlled substance and possession
of paraphernalia, and (ii) driving on a denied driver's license and failure to
appear. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5; R. 145:30. At this June 2000 hearing, the Midvale
Justice Court advised Peterson of his rights and he waived his right to counsel in
both of these cases. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5.
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B.

Peterson's Guilty Plea

On July 18, 2000, two days before his scheduled trial, Peterson appeared
voluntarily in the Taylorsville Justice Court to plead guilty to the charges of
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. R.
145:40, 44; Exhibit 8. Peterson entered Judge Kwan's courtroom, and remained
there while Judge Kwan completed his afternoon calendar of about thirty to fifty
cases. R: 145:59, 62.
After Judge Kwan completed his calendar, he wondered why Peterson
remained in the courtroom. R. 145:64. Peterson's case was not scheduled for
hearing that day. R. 145:59. Peterson said he wanted "to take care o f his case,
and did not want to come back for his trial. R. 145:73. Judge Kwan told him to
take the written Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Rights (Exhibit 7) (the
"Waiver") and "sit down and read it." R. 145:74. Peterson "was not happy" that
Judge Kwan made him read the Waiver. R. 145:73.
Peterson acknowledged he signed the Waiver, R. 145:27, 41, which stated
in part:
COUNSEL. I have the right to consult with and be
represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am
too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one
to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be
required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me.
Exhibit 7. Peterson signed his initials after this paragraph, indicating that he
affirmatively waived his right to counsel.
8

The Waiver further informed Peterson of his right to a jury trial, his right to
an appeal, that he was presumed innocent, that each element of the charged
offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that by entering a plea
he could face enhanced penalties for future convictions. Jd
In addition to the Waiver, Peterson also executed a document entitled
"Possession of Controlled Substance (marijuana)." Exhibit 9. This document
explained the elements of the offense of possession of a controlled substance,
described the applicable penalties for the crime, and the enhanced penalties that
could apply to Peterson in the future. Id.
Judge Kwan remained on the bench while Peterson read, signed, and
initialed the Waiver. R. 145:74. Judge Kwan testified that he knew "for a fact"
that Peterson read the Waiver. R. 145:59.
After Peterson read, signed, and initialed his Waiver, Judge Kwan went
through his "typical" Rule 11 colloquy twice with Peterson. R. 145:57-58. The
reason Judge Kwan went through his Rule 11 colloquy twice is that Peterson had
two separate criminal cases pending against him in Taylorsville (possession of a
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia), and he chose to
plead guilty in both cases. See R. 115.
The docket of the Taylorsville Justice Court confirms that Peterson was
advised of his Rule 11 rights. Exhibit 8. Judge Kwan testified that his Rule 11
colloquy included the following:

9

Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he actually read the Waiver. R.

145:55-56.
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he read and understood the English
language. R. 145:56.
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he understood that by entering a
plea, Peterson would be giving up or waiving each of the
constitutional rights listed on the Waiver. Jd
Judge Kwan informed Peterson that he could go to jail. idL
Judge Kwan informed Peterson that if he wanted an attorney and
could not afford one, "there was a process that we could go through
to see if [Peterson] qualified to have one appointed [for him] at little
or no cost." R. 145:56-57.
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if anybody promised him anything to
induce him to enter his plea. R. 145:56.
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if anyone threatened him or forced him
to enter his plea.

\_±

In addition, when Judge Kwan called his cases individually, he reads to the
defendant "the charges, the date that it allegedly occurred, location." R. 145:55.
Peterson admitted in his testimony that Judge Kwan advised him of most of
these rights. R. 145:42-50. Specifically:

10

Peterson testified that Judge Kwan told him "that by entering a guilty
plea in this case that it could be used later to enhance another
conviction." R. 145: 42.
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan asked if he read and understood
the English language. R. 145:49-50.
•

Peterson testified that Judge Kwan asked if he understood that by
entering a guilty plea he was giving up the rights in the Waiver. R.
145:50.

•

Peterson testified that Judge Kwan discussed "the consequences of
a guilty plea .. .the fact that you could be sentenced to jail." \±

•

Peterson testified that Judge Kwan explained "how long [Peterson]
could be sentenced to jail before [he] entered [his] guilty plea." id
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan said that if he "couldn't afford a
lawyer and if [he] wanted one, the Court would appoint one." R.
145:42.

•

Peterson testified that Judge Kwan asked if he wanted a lawyer, R.
145:49, and Peterson indicated that he did not want a lawyer, j d

Based on Judge Kwan's close familiarity with Peterson through this case
and other cases, Judge Kwan concluded that Peterson "understood his rights."
R. 145:60. Indeed, Judge Kwan "would not have gone forward" had he "even
suspected" that Peterson did not understand his rights. Jd,

11

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The crux of this appeal is whether a naked allegation that a defendant was
denied his right to counsel, without even a scintilla of supporting evidence, is
sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to a criminal
conviction.
It is undisputed in this case that Peterson was convicted in the Taylorsville
Justice Court and that he failed to avail himself of his right to a trial de novo in
district court. Under this Court's precedents, Peterson's claim for post-conviction
relief is therefore barred unless he can demonstrate that "unusual circumstances"
excuse his failure to exhaust his legal remedies.
There are no unusual circumstances in this case. As a threshold matter,
Peterson's claim that he was deprived of his right to counsel is not facially
plausible. He did not testify that he did not waive his right to counsel, or that his
waiver was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. The mere fact that Peterson
was not represented by counsel does not constitute unusual circumstances. This
Court should not permit the unusual circumstances exception to swallow the rule,
thus undermining the policy in favor of the finality of criminal convictions.
But even if this Court were to find that unusual circumstances were
present, the court of appeals was correct in alternatively ruling that the
presumption of regularity attaches to Peterson's conviction. There is ample
evidence that Peterson waived his right to counsel, and the court of appeals did
12

not err in finding that Peterson's written waiver of his right to counsel constituted
evidence sufficient to cloak Peterson's conviction with the presumption of
regularity. The court of appeals properly found that the evidence presented by
Peterson, including his own self-serving testimony, was inadequate to overcome
the presumption of regularity. There is no evidence in the record that Peterson's
plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent.
Nevertheless, should this Court determine that Peterson adduced sufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity, the record demonstrates that
Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel comported with constitutional standards.
Peterson was advised of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to
counsel, and the range of punishments possible upon his guilty plea. These
warnings satisfy the requirements of Iowa v. Tovar. 541 U.S. 77 (2004) to waive
the right to counsel in the context of a guilty plea. And even if this Court's preTovar requirements were applied, the record shows that Peterson was
adequately advised concerning his rights to make a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

13

ARGUMENT
I.

Peterson's Constitutional Claim Is Not Facially Plausible, and
Therefore No Unusual Circumstances Are Present that Could Justify
Post-Conviction Relief
A.

This Court Rejects Post-Conviction Challenges that Are Not
Facially Plausible

Peterson contends that a mere naked allegation that a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was violated is sufficient to constitute unusual
circumstances that justify post-conviction review. Peterson is wrong. This Court
requires a facially plausible allegation of a constitutional violation, and Peterson's
claim is not facially plausible because he produced no evidence in the district
court to support his claim.
Under this Court's procedural bar jurisprudence, defendants are not eligible
for post-conviction relief unless they first exhaust their legal remedies. Lucero v.
Kennard. 2005 UT 79, U 32,125 P.3d 917. Justice court defendants must pursue
a trial de novo to exhaust their legal remedies. ]cL at U 41. Peterson did not
pursue a trial de novo, and therefore his constitutional challenge to his sentence
is barred unless he can demonstrate that "unusual circumstances" excuse his
failure to exhaust his legal remedies. See \± at U 42.
"To qualify for the unusual circumstances exception to the procedural bar
rules, a petitioner must demonstrate that 'an obvious injustice or a substantial and
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right' has occurred." jd^ at If 45 (quoting
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Carter v. Galetka. 2001 UT 96, If 15, 44 P.3d 626). Claims that constitutional
rights were violated, without more, do not automatically rise to the level of
unusual circumstances. See Benvenuto v. State. 2007 UT 53, fflj 27-35, 582
Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (ineffective assistance of counsel claim time barred);
Gardner v. Galetka. 2004 UT 42, fl 16, 94 P.3d 263 (ineffective assistance of
counsel claim not an unusual circumstance where it was not facially plausible);
Rudolph v. Galetka. 2002 UT 7, fflj 3, 6,43 P.3d 467 (claim that defendant was
denied right to represent himself not constitute an unusual circumstance);
Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d 608, 614 (Utah 1995) (meritless constitutional
claims that court should have advised defendant of right to remain silent and that
defendant's due process rights violated, were not unusual circumstances).
This Court has made it clear that it does not consider whether unusual
circumstances exist where the claim is not "facially plausible." Gardner v.
Galetka. 2007 UT 3, fl 30, 151 P.3d 968; Gardner v. Galetka. 2004 UT 42, fl 16,
94 P.2d 263. Were it otherwise, the "unusual circumstances" exception would
swallow the rule that a defendant must first exhaust legal remedies before
seeking post-conviction relief. A justice court defendant could challenge a
sentence years after it was issued based on a claimed constitutional violation,
without a scintilla of supporting evidence. If this Court's procedural bar
jurisprudence has any vitality, a defendant must have some evidence to support a
post-conviction challenge, or that challenge must be precluded.

15

B.

Peterson's Claim that He Was Deprived of His Right to Counsel
Is Not Facially Plausible

This Court's recent decision in State v. Von Ferguson clarified the minimal
evidentiary burden that is required to rebut the presumption of regularity that
attaches to a criminal conviction. 2007 UT 1, fl 40-41. To meet this minimal
evidentiary burden established by Von Ferguson. Peterson is required to "present
'some evidence that he . . . was not represented by counsel and did not
knowingly waive counsel.'" j d at fl 40 (quoting State v. Triptow. 770 P.2d 146,
149 (Utah 1989)). The Von Ferguson Court further clarified that the requirement
of "'some evidence' may be satisfied by a defendant's own testimony." id.
The evidence presented by Peterson in the district court did not satisfy the
minimal evidentiary burden established by this Court in Von Ferguson. It is true
that the only evidence presented by Peterson was his self-serving testimony.
However, nowhere in his testimony does Peterson claim that he did not waive his
right to counsel or that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent.
Peterson has never claimed that his waiver was involuntary; or that he did not
understand what he was doing when he waived his right to counsel; or that he
lacked the intelligence to understand the consequences of the waiver of the right
to counsel.1

1

While Peterson's counsel made statements to this effect, R. 145:15,17,
these statements were not supported by evidence and have no evidentiary value.
Peterson's evidence (consisting solely of his own testimony) did not include any
testimony that his waiver was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent.

16

Peterson's Petition (R. 1) fails to assert that his waiver was not knowing,
voluntary, or intelligent. At most, the unverified Petition asserts that Peterson
"was sentenced to jail in violation of the Sixth Amendment." \_± Likewise, not
once in Peterson's testimony did he claim that his waiver was not knowing,
voluntary, or intelligent. See R. 145:25-51. This case is thus easily
distinguishable from Von Ferguson because the defendant in Von Ferguson
testified that he did not waive his right to counsel. Von Ferguson. 2007 UT 1 at 1J
41. By contrast, Peterson admitted in his testimony that he waived his right to
counsel. R. 145:41-42, 45-46, 49.
The question is thus whether Peterson's counsel's naked allegations of a
constitutional violation are sufficient to meet Peterson's burden to demonstrate
that his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid. The United States Supreme
Court considered this issue in Iowa v. Tovar. 541 U.S. 77 (2004). Tovar. like the
instant case, arose out of a "collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction." i d
at 92. The Court recognized that in this procedural context, "it is the defendant's
burden to prove that he did not completely and intelligently waive his right to the
assistance of counsel." ig\ The Court noted that the defendant "has never
claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the range of punishment for
the crime prior to pleading guilty," id, nor did the defendant "assert that he was
unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment." id. at 93.
Instead, the defendant in Tovar maintained that his waiver of counsel was invalid

17

because the trial court had inadequately warned him of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation. \_± at 85. In a unanimous decision, the
Supreme Court reversed the Iowa Supreme Court's holding that the defendant's
waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights was invalid. I d at 94.
Peterson is in a similar situation to the Tovar defendant, as Peterson never
claimed that his waiver of his right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing, or
intelligent. In the absence of any evidence that Peterson's waiver of counsel was
not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent, Peterson has failed to meet his burden to
prove his waiver of Sixth Amendment rights was invalid. Cf Moench v. State.
2004 UT App 57, ffl[1, 16-18, 88 P.3d 353 (considering merits of petition for postconviction relief where defendant claimed that he did not enter "a voluntary and
knowledgeable guilty plea").
Peterson has utterly failed to meet his minimal evidentiary burden to show
that his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Peterson has the acknowledged burden of introducing evidence that his waiver of
counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. He has admitted that his
waiver was voluntary, and he had not testified or otherwise produced evidence to
show that his waiver was not knowing or intelligent. Peterson's post-conviction
collateral attack on his sentence is not facially plausible.
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C.

The Fact that Peterson Was Not Represented by Counsel Does
Not Represent "Unusual Circumstances" to Justify His Failure
to Seek a Trial De Novo

Peterson cites to exactly one fact that he claims constitutes "unusual
circumstances": he was not represented by counsel in the justice court
proceedings. But Peterson does not cite a single case which has found that a
convicted defendant's pro se status, standing alone, was sufficient to meet the
"unusual circumstances" exception to the exhaustion of remedies requirement.
Taylorsville respectfully submits that this Court should construe the
"unusual circumstances" exception as an exception. It is the exception to the
rule, reserved for cases that fall outside the norm. If Peterson's argument were
accepted, then every single p_ro se defendant would effectively have an unlimited
period of time to collaterally challenge their convictions. This "would allow that
exception to swallow up the rule, thereby transforming habeas corpus from an
extraordinary remedy into an alternative appeal mechanism in contravention of
the finality of criminal judgments that is the settled policy of this state." Codianna
v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Utah 1983).
The cases Peterson relies upon to the contrary are distinguishable.
Several of them are cases involving the ineffective assistance of counsel, which
present very different considerations. One of the cases Peterson cites, Rudolph
v. Galetka. points out that "'[wjhen trial counsel represents [a] defendant on
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appeal an ineffective assistance claim cannot be raised because it is
unreasonable to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue of [her] own
ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal.'" 2002 UT 7, H 7, 43 P.3d 467 (quoting
State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900, 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). Indeed, in another
case Peterson cites, Chess v. Smith, the defendant's counsel advised the
defendant "that he stood 'a substantial chance' of receiving a much harsher
sentence upon retrial and thus was advised not to pursue an appeal." 617 P.2d
341, 343 (Utah 1980). This Court stated that "[t]his advice was clearly contrary to
the law." Id These abuses that are inherent in an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim are simply not present where a defendant proceeds p_ro se.
Other cases relied on by Peterson are within the class of "numerous Utah
cases which have addressed the merits of habeas claims even though the issues
raised were known or should have been known to petitioner and his counsel at
the time of conviction and should have been raised on appeal." Codianna. 660
P.2d at 1114 (Stewart, J., concurring). Brown v. Turner. 440 P.2d 968 (Utah
1968) and Webster v. Jones. 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978) fall within this class. See
Codianna. 660 P.2d at 1114 (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding that "[a] reading" of
[Brown v. Turner] makes clear that the petitioner either knew or should have
known at the time of his conviction of those errors that were later asserted in his
habeas petition.") None of these decisions found any unusual circumstances
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present to justify the defendant's failure to raise Sixth Amendment claims on
direct appeal.
This Court's recent decision of Benvenuto v. State. 2007 UT 53, 582 Utah
Adv. Rep. 22, presented facts very similar to the instant case. There, a
defendant "waited several years after the expiration of the PCRA limitations
period to file his petition for post-conviction relief." ]cL at fl 33. The defendant
argued that his delay was justified because he could not afford to retain an
attorney. | d This Court found that this justification was "simply inadequate," and
that the defendant did not "meet the interests of justice exception to the statute of
limitations. As such, his claims are time barred under the PCRA." Jkl at fflf
34-35.
Like the petitioner in Benvenuto. Peterson's pio se status alone is
insufficient to create "unusual circumstances." There is no reason that Peterson
could not have sought a trial de novo and subsequently requested the
appointment of counsel to assist Peterson in pursuing his claims, jd. at U 34. In
the absence of "unusual circumstances," Peterson's claims are barred by his
failure to first pursue a trial de novo.
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II.

Should this Court Reach the Merits of Peterson's Petition, it Should
Affirm the Court of Appeals' Ruling that Peterson Failed to Prove a
Violation of His Right to Counsel
A.

The Presumption of Regularity Attaches to Peterson's
Conviction Because There Is Ample Evidence that Peterson
Waived His Right to Counsel

This Court has recently clarified the burdens of proof that apply where a
defendant challenges an uncounseled conviction based on an alleged deprivation
of the defendant's right to counsel. In Lucero v. Kennard. this Court ruled that a
"court may not presume waiver of the right to counsel unless there is some
evidence that the defendant affirmatively acquiesced to the waiver of counsel."
2005 UT 79, fl 25,125 P.3d 917. Furthermore, in State v. Von Ferguson, this
ruling was clarified: "it is impermissible to presume a waiver of counsel where a
trial record is silent on the issue of waiver." 2007 UT 1, U 37. The court of
appeals in this case correctly allocated the burdens of proof: "where there is
some evidence that a defendant has acquiesced in the trial court's failure to
appoint counsel, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to establish that he
did not validly waive his right to counsel." Peterson v. Kennard. 2007 UT App 26,
1J14, 156P.3d834.
Thus, the threshold question is whether there is "some evidence" that
Peterson waived his right to counsel. The court of appeals focused on the
Waiver, which is perhaps the strongest evidence of Peterson's waiver of his right

22

to counsel. Indeed, Peterson admitted that he signed the Waiver, R. 145:27, 41,
which stated in part:
COUNSEL. I have the right to consult with and be
represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am
too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one
to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be
required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me.
Exhibit 7. Peterson signed his initials after this paragraph, indicating that he
affirmatively waived his right to counsel.
Although certainly the Waiver is sufficient standing alone to constitute
"some evidence" that Peterson waived his right to counsel, the record in this case
is replete with evidence of Peterson's waiver. This includes the justice court's
docket entry, which indicates that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 rights.
Exhibit 8. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-122 (2002): "Entries in a justice
court judge's docket under Section 78-5-121, certified by the judge or his
successor in office, are prima facie evidence of the facts stated." Utah R. Crim.
P. 11 (e) provides in part that a court may not accept a guilty plea unless the
judge has found that "if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she
has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel."
Accordingly, the docket constitutes prima facie evidence that Peterson knowingly
waived his right to counsel.
Moreover, Peterson admitted in his testimony that he waived his right to
counsel. R. 145:41-42, 45-46, 49. Furthermore, in connection with the charges
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at issue, Peterson also signed an "Application for Admission to City of Taylorsville
Substance Abuse Court" (the "Application"). Exhibit 6. The Application included
the following paragraph which Peterson initialed: "Counsel. I have the right to
consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine
that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to
represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay
for the appointed lawyer's service to me." ]a\
The evidence that Peterson waived his right to counsel far exceeded this
Court's minimal "some evidence" standard. The court of appeals in this case
correctly found that the Waiver "alone is sufficient to evidence Peterson's
affirmative acquiescence in the justice court's failure to appoint counsel and shift
the burden of establishing a Sixth Amendment violation onto Peterson." Peterson
v. Kennard. 2007 UT App 26, fl 16, 156 P.3d 834.

B.

Peterson Failed to Adduce Any Evidence that He Did Not Waive
His Right to Counsel or that His Waiver Was Not Knowing,
Voluntary, and Intelligent

To rebut the presumption of regularity that attaches to Peterson's
conviction, it is his burden to come forward with "some evidence to rebut the
presumption of regularity." State v. Von Ferguson. 2007 UT 1, fl 41. It is not
enough for Peterson to "merely produce a copy of the conviction reflecting that he
was not represented by counsel." ]o\ Thus, in Von Ferguson, a defendant's
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testimony that he "did not waive his right to counsel" was sufficient to overcome
the presumption of regularity. \±
It is true that Peterson testified in the district court concerning the
circumstances of his guilty plea. But in stark contrast to Von Ferguson. Peterson
admitted in his testimony that his plea was voluntary. R. 145:41-42, 45-46, 49.
Peterson did not testify that he did not waive his right to counsel. Likewise, not
once in Peterson's testimony did he claim that his waiver was not knowing,
voluntary, or intelligent. See R. 145:25-51.
Given the presumption of regularity, and in the absence of even a scintilla
of evidence to rebut the presumption, Peterson's conviction must stand. The
court of appeals correctly concluded that "Peterson failed to meet his burden of
proving a violation" of his right to counsel. Peterson v. Kennard. 2007 UT App
26,1|16, 156 P.3d 834.

C.

Even Assuming Peterson Produced Evidence to Rebut the
Presumption of Regularity, His Waiver of Counsel Was
Constitutionally Valid
1.

Standards for Waiver of the Right to Counsel

Peterson's argument focuses on a rigid mantra that he claims a court must
recite for a waiver of the right to counsel to be valid. The United States Supreme
Court rejected a similar argument that a court must conduct a specific colloquy for
the waiver of the right to counsel to be effective. See Iowa v. Tovar. 541 U.S. 77,
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88 (2004) ("We have not, however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to
a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel"). To the
contrary, "[t]he information a defendant must possess in order to make an
intelligent decision . . . will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including
the defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature
of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding." |a\; accord State v. Pedockie.
2006 UT 28, II40, 137 P.3d 716 ("we have recognized that the validity of a
defendant's waiver turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
each case").
In the context of the waiver of counsel to enter a guilty plea, the Sixth
Amendment "is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of
the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of
the range of allowable punishments attendant upon entry of a guilty plea." Tovar.
541 U.S. at 81. The United States Supreme Court clarified that a more searching
colloquy is required where a defendant seeks to proceed through trial pro se.
i d at 90; cf State v. Pedockie. 2006 UT 28, fflj 42, 50, 51, 137 P.3d 716
(requiring a more searching colloquy where defendant seeks to proceed through
trial p_ro se).
However, "at earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or
formal colloquy may suffice." Tovar, 541 U.S. at 89. This is so "not because
pretrial proceedings are 'less important' than trial, but because, at that stage, 'the
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full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and
more obvious to the accused than they are at trial.'" j d at 90 (quoting Patterson v.
Illinois. 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988)).
Before the Tovar decision, this Court ruled that "before a defendant can
waive the right to counsel, 'the defendant "should be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that... he knows what he is doing
and his choice is made with eyes open."'" State v. Arauelles. 2003 UT 1, 1} 70, 63
P.2d 731 (quoting State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183,187 (Utah 1987) (quoting
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). To establish the validity of a
waiver of the right to counsel, trial courts should do the following:
(1) advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to defend himself; (2)
ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity
to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to
represent himself, including the expectation that the defendant will
comply with technical rules and the recognition that presenting a
defense is not just a matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain
that the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case.
State v. Arguelles. 2003 UT 1, H 70, 63 P.2d 731 (quoting State v. Heaton. 958
P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998)).
Taylorsville contends that Tovar overruled Utah precedent to the extent
Utah cases may require a more searching colloquy to waive the right to counsel
in the context of a guilty plea. See Tovar. 541 U.S. at 81 (overruling Iowa
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Supreme Court's requirement of two specific warnings that were not necessary
under the Sixth Amendment).2 However, as will be demonstrated below, even if
the more detailed requirements of the pre-Tovar Utah precedent are applied,
Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel was valid.
2.

Peterson's Waiver of Counsel Was Valid Under the Tovar
Court's Standards

Tovar enunciated the standard for a valid waiver of the right to counsel in
the context of entering a guilty plea as follows: "The constitutional requirement is
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges
against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of
allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea." k± The
constitutional requirement was satisfied in this case.
First, Peterson was informed of the nature of the charges against him. It is
undisputed that Peterson signed Exhibit 9, which indicates that Peterson was
charged with possession of controlled substance. Moreover, when Judge Kwan
called Peterson's case, he read to Peterson "the charges, the date that it
allegedly occurred, location." R. 145:55. It is also clear that Peterson knew the
nature of the charges against him based on the Waiver, which contained a
handwritten notation (presumably Peterson's own handwritten notation) near the

2

Peterson has not challenged his sentence on the basis of the Utah
Constitution, instead, he has relied solely on the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. See R. 1-5; Peterson's Brief at 1-2.
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top of the Waiver "POCS + PODP," or possession of controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 7. Moreover, Peterson has never
contended that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him.
The docket of the Taylorsville Justice Court independently satisfies this
requirement. The docket indicated that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11
rights. Exhibit 8. Further, the district court found that Peterson was advised of
his Rule 11 rights twice on July 18, 2000. R. 115. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-5-122 (2002): "Entries in a justice court judge's docket under Section 78-5121, certified by the judge or his successor in office, are prima facie evidence of
the facts stated." Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e) provides in part that a court may not
accept a guilty plea unless the judge has found that "the defendant understands
the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered ..." Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A). Accordingly, the docket constitutes prima facie evidence
that Peterson was informed of the nature of the charges against him.
Second, Peterson was informed of his right to be counseled regarding his
plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(1) requires a judge to determine that "if the
defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the
right to counsel and does not desire counsel." Since the docket (Exhibit 8)
indicates that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 rights, the docket is prima
facie evidence that Peterson knowingly waived his right to counsel.

29

The evidence in the district court was consistent with the docket entry.
Peterson admitted in his testimony that Judge Kwan told him that if he "couldn't
afford a lawyer and if [he] wanted one, the Court would appoint one for [him]." R.
145:42. Peterson also conceded that Judge Kwan asked if Peterson wanted a
lawyer, R. 145:49, and Peterson indicated that he did not want a lawyer. \±
Further, the Waiver Peterson executed advised him: "I have the right to consult
with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am
too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to represent
me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me." Exhibit 7. Finally, Peterson executed the
Application (Exhibit 6) which also informed him of his right to counsel.
Third, Peterson was advised of the range of allowable punishments
attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(5) requires a
judge accepting a guilty plea to determine that "the defendant knows the
minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which
a plea is entered, including the possibility of consecutive sentences." Since the
docket indicates that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 rights (Exhibit 8), the
docket entry is prima facie evidence that Peterson was advised of the range of
punishments he faced as a result of his guilty plea.
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Again, the testimony in the proceeding below was consistent with the
docket. Peterson admitted that Judge Kwan told him "that by entering a guilty
plea in this case that it could be used later on to enhance another conviction." R.
145:42. Peterson also admitted that Judge Kwan discussed with him "the
consequences of a guilty plea .. .the fact that you could be sentenced to jail."
R. 145:50. And Peterson acknowledged that Judge Kwan explained to him "how
long [Peterson] could be sentenced to jail before [he] entered [his] guilty plea." R.
145:50. Peterson also executed Exhibit 9, which explains the penalty and
enhanced penalty applicable to possession of marijuana. Moreover, Peterson
has never claimed that he did not understand the range of allowable punishments
attendant to pleading guilty in this case.
In sum, even if this Court determines that Peterson presented sufficient
evidence in the district court to overcome the presumption of regularity, the
information and warnings the Taylorsville Justice Court conveyed to Peterson
satisfied the Tovar standard.
3.

Peterson's Waiver of Counsel Was Valid Under the PreTovar Utah Precedent

Tovar implicitly overruled Utah precedent to the extent it required
information in addition to the Tovar standard to be conveyed to a defendant
pleading guilty without counsel. As an example, under pre-Tovar precedent, a
judge is arguably required to inform a defendant waiving counsel that the
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defendant will need to comply with technical rules, such as the rules of evidence.
See State v. Arauelles. 2003 UT 1, fl 70, 63 P.3d 731. 3 While this type of warning
would make sense for a criminal defendant proceeding to trial p_ro se, it has no
application to a defendant who is simply pleading guilty two days before a
scheduled trial. Said another way, Tovar clarified that a wooden recitation of
specific warnings which are irrelevant to pleading guilty is not required.
Nonetheless, even if the more exacting standards of Utah's pre-Tovar case
law are considered, Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel was still valid.
a.

Peterson Was Aware of the Dangers and
Disadvantages of Self-Representation

Peterson was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation when he waived his right to counsel in this case. As stated by this
Court, a defendant "'"should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, so t h a t . . . he knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eves open.""' Jd. (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d
183, 187 (Utah 1987) (quoting Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).

3

Peterson's brief on this appeal (page 42) makes this precise argument:
Peterson should have been asked about his knowledge of the rules of evidence.
The rules of evidence have no bearing on a decision to plead guilty without the
benefit of counsel, although they would certainly be relevant in the context of a
defendant seeking to waive counsel at trial.
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Here, Judge Kwan specifically testified that he "was comfortable that
[Peterson] understood English and he understood what we were talking about
and he understood the consequences of what he was doing." R: 145:74
(emphasis added). Judge Kwan formed this opinion based on his close familiarity
with Peterson on several cases over the year before Peterson signed the Waiver.
Indeed, Judge Kwan "would not have gone forward" had he "even suspected" that
Peterson did not understand his rights. R: 145:60.
Peterson was also intimately familiar with the consequences of pleading
guilty p_ro se as a result of his having done so in two cases before the Midvale
Justice Court approximately six months before he waived his right to counsel in
this case. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5. Peterson had also pleaded guilty and waived
counsel in connection with two separate cases in the Taylorsville Justice Court in
1999, the year before the guilty pleas in the instant case. Exhibit 2; Exhibit 3.
Peterson was no novice to the criminal justice system and the consequences of
waiving counsel and pleading guilty to crimes.
Given this evidence that Peterson was intimately familiar with the dangers
and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, and the lack of evidence to the
contrary, the district court's finding that Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel
was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" (R. 118) was entirely appropriate.
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b.

Peterson was Advised of His Right to Counsel, and
Exercised His Right to Defend Himself

It is undisputed that Judge Kwan advised Peterson of his right to counsel.
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan asked if Peterson wanted a lawyer, R. 145:49,
and Peterson indicated that he did not want a lawyer. ] d Peterson also testified
that Judge Kwan told him that if he "couldn't afford a lawyer and if [he] wanted
one, the Court would appoint one for [him]." R. 145:42. The Waiver Peterson
signed also explained Peterson's right to an attorney, and that "[i]f the judge were
to determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could
appoint one to represent me." Exhibit 7. Peterson also signed the Application
(Exhibit 6) which informed Peterson of his right to counsel.
Peterson argues on this appeal that he was not adequately informed of his
right to self-representation. Peterson's Brief at 31. But it is beyond dispute that
Peterson knew of this right, since he in fact exercised it in this case (and other
cases). It strains credulity for Peterson to suggest that his sentence should be
overturned because he was not advised of a right that he not only knew of, but in
fact exercised.
c.

Judge Kwan Ascertained that Peterson Possessed
the Intelligence and Capacity to Understand and
Appreciate the Consequences of his Decision to
Represent Himself

Judge Kwan was very familiar with Peterson and his capacity when
Peterson entered his guilty plea on July 18, 2000. R. 145:55, 59. Indeed,
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Peterson had appeared before Judge Kwan at least seven times between March
and June 27, 2000. Exhibit 8. Peterson testified that he was familiar with Judge
Kwan by the time he appeared before him on July 18, 2000. R. 145:33.
Peterson also acknowledged that he "had appeared numerous times in front of
Judge Kwan" before executing the Waiver. R.145:41. Peterson had "been a
defendant" in Judge Kwan's court "for probably over a year on other matters." R.
145:59. It is within the context of a defendant and a judge who were very familiar
with each other that Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel must be considered.
Judge Kwan remained on the bench while Peterson read and signed his
Waiver. R. 145:74. Judge Kwan testified that he knew "for a fact" that Peterson
read the Waiver. R. 145:59.
After Peterson read and signed the Waiver, Judge Kwan asked Peterson if
he actually read the Waiver, and asked Peterson if he read and understood the
English language. R. 145:55-56. Peterson conceded that Judge Kwan asked
Peterson if he read and understood the English language. R. 145:49-50.
Based on Judge Kwan's close familiarity with Peterson on several cases
over the year before Peterson signed the Waiver, Judge Kwan concluded that
Peterson "understood his rights." R. 145:60. Indeed, Judge Kwan "would not
have gone forward" had he "even suspected" that Peterson did not understand
his rights. \± Although Judge Kwan did not specifically recall whether he asked
Peterson about his educational level, by June 18, 2000 Judge Kwan "was
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comfortable that [Peterson] understood English and understood what we were
talking about and he understood the consequences of what he was doing." R.
145:74. Similarly, in Moench v. State. 2004 UT App 57, U 19, the court of
appeals found that a defendant's waiver of counsel was valid based in part on
testimony of defendant's attorney "that he was confident that Defendant
understood the contents of the plea affidavit."
It is also noteworthy that Peterson was not a novice to the criminal justice
system, and was not unfamiliar with the concept of pleading guilty and waiving his
right to counsel. See State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(taking into account that defendant "had previously been involved in a trial" in
determining defendant intelligently waived his right to counsel); ct State v.
Valencia. 2001 UT App. 159, U 22, 27 P.3d 573 (taking into consideration fact
that defendant "had never experienced a jury trial"). Less than six months before
Peterson appeared to plead guilty on the charges at issue in the instant case,
Peterson had appeared before Judge Kwan, pleaded guilty, and waived his right
to counsel in connection with two separate cases. Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2; Exhibit 3.
Furthermore, about a month before Peterson pleaded guilty to the charges at
issue in this case, Peterson appeared in two separate cases in the Midvale
Justice Court, pleaded guilty, and waived his right to counsel. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5.
Given Peterson's prior experiences in the Taylorsville Justice Court and
other courts in waiving his right to counsel, Judge Kwan's close familiarity with

36

Peterson, and the record in the proceeding below, it is apparent that Judge Kwan
ascertained that Peterson had the intelligence and capacity to understand his
decision to waive the right to counsel. Indeed, the district court found that "based
upon the judge's familiarity and experience with Mr. Peterson, he determined that
Mr. Peterson was able to represent himself." R. 110-11. Notably, Peterson has
not claimed that he lacked the intelligence or capacity to understand what he was
doing on July 18, 2000. Since there is evidence that Peterson's waiver was
intelligent, and no evidence to the contrary, the district court did not err in finding
that Peterson's waiver of the right to counsel was intelligent. R. 118.
d.

Judge Kwan Ascertained that Peterson
Comprehended the Nature of the Charges and
Proceedings and the Range of Permissible
Punishments

It is beyond dispute that Peterson was informed of the nature of the charges
against him and the range of permissible punishments. The docket of the
Taylorsville Justice Court alone satisfies this requirement. The docket indicated
that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 rights. Likewise, the district court found
that Judge Kwan completed two Rule 11 colloquies with Peterson on July 18,
2000. R. 115. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) provides in part that a court may not accept
a guilty plea unless the judge has found that "the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered . . . " Utah R. Crim.
P. 11 (e)(4)(A). This rule also requires the court to determine that "the defendant
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knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum
mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(5). Since the docket
entry constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts stated, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5122 (2002), the docket is prima facie evidence that Peterson was advised of the
nature of the charges against him and the range of permissible punishments.
Moreover, Peterson's own testimony establishes that he knew of the range
of punishments he could face by pleading guilty. Peterson admitted that Judge
Kwan told him "that by entering a guilty plea in this case that it could be used later
on to enhance another conviction." R. 145:42. Peterson also admitted that Judge
Kwan discussed with him "the consequences of a guilty plea .. .the fact that you
could be sentenced to jail." R. 145:50. And Peterson acknowledged that Judge
Kwan explained to him "how long [Peterson] could be sentenced to jail before [he]
entered [his] guilty plea." R. 145:50. In addition to this colloquy, Peterson
executed Exhibit 9, which explains the penalty and enhanced penalty applicable to
possession of marijuana.
The evidence in the district court also demonstrated that Peterson was
informed of the nature of the charges against him. Peterson signed Exhibit 9,
which indicates that Peterson was charged with Possession of Controlled
Substance (marijuana). Moreover, when Judge Kwan called his cases, he reads
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to the defendant "the charges, the date that it allegedly occurred, location." R.
145:55. It is also clear that Peterson knew the nature of the charges against him
based on his executing the Waiver, which stated at the top that the charges
against him were "POCS + PODP," or possession of controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 7.
In short, there was ample evidence to demonstrate that Peterson's guilty
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, even if the factors considered by preTovar Utah decisions are considered. The district court correctly concluded that
Peterson "made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel,"
(R. 118), and therefore the court of appeals decision should be affirmed, should
the Court reach the merits of Peterson's Petition.
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CONCLUSION
There is no evidence in the record that Peterson did not waive his right to
counsel, or that Peterson's waiver was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent.
Under these circumstances, Peterson's counsel's argument that his waiver
violated the Sixth Amendment is not facially plausible, and accordingly there are
no unusual circumstances present to justify Peterson's collateral attack on his
sentence. Even if the Court were to consider the merits of Peterson's request for
post-conviction relief, given that not even a scintilla of evidence supports
Peterson's claim that he was deprived of his right to counsel, the presumption of
regularity must prevail. This Court should affirm the court of appeals' alternative
holdings that Peterson did not demonstrate that unusual circumstances existed to
justify post-conviction relief, and that on the merits Peterson failed to meet his
burden to prove a violation of his right to counsel.

Respectfully Submitted this 26th day of September, 2007.
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